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COLORADO 
Report of the Special Master 
-on the Equitable Apportionment 
of the Vermejo River 
v. 
NEW 
S RY: The Special Master (Ewing T. Kerr) has filed a report ------=----
in this original action which was brought to determine whether 
Colorado is entitled to any diversion of the Vermejo River. After 
reviewing all of the available evidence and the applicable case law 
on equitable apportionment, he concludes that Colorado (Plaintiff) 
should be permitted a transmountain diversion of 4,000 acre-fee per 
1/ 
calendar year. The diversion would be from three creeks- which have 
their source within Colorado's boundaries and ultimately feed into 
the Vermejo River running through portions of New Mexico. 







DISCUSSION: It is appropriate to follow the usual procedure 
by ordering the Report to be filed and inviting the parties to file 
y 
exceptions. A detailed memorandum will be prepared after the 
parties reply or the timing for filing their replies has expired. 




2/Exceptions to the Report should be filed within 45 days and 
any replies should be filed within 30 days thereafter. 
.· 
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Exceptions of New Mexico to Report of 
the Special Master and Reply. 
Motion of Kaiser Steel Corporation, 
et al. for Leave to File a Brief as 
Amici Curiae. 
1982, the Special Master {Ewing T. Kerr} filed 
his Report in this litigation centering on use by Colorado of water diverted 
~ ........ --- ___ ___... 
from the Verrnejo River.l He concluded that Colorado is entitled to a 
'--"" --· ...., 
transmountain diversion of 4,000 acre-feet per calendar year. New Mexico has 
now filed exceptions to the Report, users of the river have filed an amicus 
brief, and Colorado has filed responses both to New Mexico's exceptions and to 
the amicus brief. Colorado has waived the right to file exceptions to the 
Report. 
FACTS: This original action was instituted by Colorado in an attempt to 
determine its water rights with regard to the Vermejo River, a non-navigable 
--.....--
- 2 -
interstate river which originates in Colorado and runs into New Mexico.2 A 
map showing the River's location is attached. In April 1979, the matter was 
referred to the Special Master who after 16 days of hearing evidence submitted 
his Report on January 9, 1982. Based upon the evidence presented and the 
applicable case law on equitable apportionment,~~~ that Colorado was 
A---
entitled to a transmountain diversion of 4,000 acre-feet per calendar year. 
/ 
The diversion would be from three Colorado creeks3 which feed into the 
vermejo. Recognizing that Colorado had, in a sense, a junior appropriation in 
the nature of an inchoate water right, the Master concluded that the equities 
favored granting the diversion. The Report was accepted on February 22, 
...., ...... ..._... 
1982. The following papers were subsequently filed: 
(1) Exceptions by New Mexico to the Master's Report; 
(2) Amicus brief by various users of the Vermejo River; 
(3) Response by Colorado to the Amicus brief; and 
(4) Reply brief by Colorado to New Mexico's exceptions. 
EXCEPI'IONS BY NEW MEXICO: New Mexico offers six excepti_9ns to the 
Special Master's report: 
(1) The Special Master has misconstrued and misapplied the law of 
equitable apportionment. The precedent from this Court (eight cases) has 
turned on principles intended to reflect the equities involved. All of the 
factors in those cases, applied to this case, indicate that the equities lie 
with New Mexico. Colorado has never a~ed the Vermejo River to beneficial 
~ ~~ ...... -...... ~ ... ,......-, ..... , 
use; it therefore possesses no equities to justify a diversion. Although not --
2The action originated in a suit by Kaiser Steel Corp. (New Mexico user 
of the river) against CF&I (Colorado prospective user). The DC (N.M. 1976) 
issued an injunction forbidding CF&I to divert any water. Colorado 
subsequently filed its complaint in this Court. 





absolute, the gu~ding principl~here. By 
granting a diversion, the Master has given Colorado the first priority. 
(2) The Special Master errs in concluding that the Court will balance 
the detriment to existing uses. His conclusion that New Mexico will suffer no 
injury is not supported by the evidence nor is it justifiable as a matter of 
law. New Mexico cites numerous exhibits and statistics to demonstrate the 
., 
great need by its users of the Vermejo River. Noting the "incompleteness" of 
---~ ~~- ............. ,.., .... 
the Report, New Mexico concludes that the Special Master could not have 
completely considered its interests in making his recommendations to the 
Court. He has ignored New Mexico's existing rights and the rights of the 
users downstream. 
(3) The Report does not evaluate facts essential to this case. Thus, it 
is impossible for this Court to adopt, reject, or modify the Report without an 
independent review of the record. "For example, the Master ignored 41,000 
acres of irrigated lands with rights in Vermejo waters below its confluence 
with the Canadian River ••• • Much of the Master's Report is based upon data 
obtained during severe drought conditions. in the 70's. 
(4) The Master's findings and conclusions are internally inconsistent 
and contradictory. Although the Master coneludes that a diversion of water 
would not injure New Mexico, he concludes that priority of appropriation 
should not govern users of the Vermejo River. However, as noted by this 
Court, if there is no injury there is no reason not to apply priorty of 
appropriation. See wyoming v. Colorado, 259 u.s. 419 (1922), Nebraska v. 
wyoming, 325 u.s. 589 (1945) and Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). 
(5) The Master failed to rule expressly on the propriety of Colorado 
(which had abandoned its own interests in the Vermejo) bringing this action on 






Colorado failed to make any beneficial use of the .vermejo. Further, Colorado 
cannot maintain an .original parens patriae action for the purpose of voiding 
an injunction against a single corporation--CF&I. That corporation persuaded - "' · 
Colorado to institute this action after it was enjoined by a DC. Indeed, 
after suit was filed, the general counsel for CF&I was commissioned as a 
Special Assistant Attorney General to act in the lit~gation. This Court has 
declined to find original jurisdiction where the State is a plaintiff in name 
only and not the real party in interest. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. Cook, 304 
u.s. 387 (1938); Kansas v. United states, 204 u.s. 331 (1907). 
(6) The Special Master ignored this Court's precedent and reached the 
"empty conclusion that the nature of the action (apportionment) compels a 
division of water." That preconceived notion biased the Master before trial 
commenced. That fact, combined with his failure to state the essential facts, 
renders his Report "wholly lacking in substance and n~rit." 
Thus, the Court should reject the Report, 90nduct an independent review 
of the record, and apply the principles of equitable apportionment as laid out 
in prior decisions. 
REPLY BY COWRADO TO NEW MEXICO'S EXCEPI'IONS: Colorado responds to New 
Mexico's exceptions by arguing that: 
(1) The Special Master properly applied the law of equitable 
apportionment. New Mexico contends that the only factor to be considered in 
equitable apportionment is priority of appropriation. This Court, however, ,, ,. 
has recognized in water apportionment cases that equitable apportionment 
requires consideration of many factors. See, ~' Kansas v. Colorado, 206 
... ........-..... ~- ......... 
u.s. 46, 117 (1907). Further, New Mexico did not sustain its burden of 
demonstrating that diversions by Colorado would seriously injure New Mexico 
and its citizens. Although Colorado is the plaintiff, case law places the _t(~ 
--.. ..... . ~ - ...I .. I 





Kansas v. Colorado, 206 u.s. 46, 117 (1907); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 
U.S. 660, 669 (1931); and Colorado v. Kansas, 320 u.s. 383, 393-94 (1943). 
New Mexico's position is contrary to the well-established rule that the 
objective in this type of a case is to apportion the waters of an interstate 
stream on the basis of equities. 
(2) This litigation is not barred by the Elev~nth Amendment. That .. 
argument has been unsuccessfully raised by New Mexico in its Brief in 
Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Complaint and was raised again before 
the Special Master. Colorado, as does New Mexico, has a substantial interest 
in this litigation because it is trustee for the waters within its territory. 
The cases cited by New Mexico on this point do not involve equitable 
apportionment proceedings involving water rights. 
(3) The doctrine of laches does not bar Colorado's claim. Colorado has 
"displayed" its interest in the Vermejo when appropriate. The right of a 
state to share in its natural resources is vested. New Mexico's argument 
would require a state to take affirmative steps to preserve rights even though 
they were not threatened. This argument py New Mexico is "one more desperate 
the Court f~ ploy• to obtain all the water from the vermejo and prevent 
considering the equities of the case. ~~--
(4) The Special Master's Report equitably apportions the Rive~ First, 
~~er one-half of the water supply for the river originates in Colorado. And a 
~,~A~ersion of 4,000 acre-feet is approximately one-fourth of the system's total 
~,flow. Second, Colorado i~ experiencing a critical water shortage in the area 
41"'- where the apportionment would occur. Third, any adverse irrpact caused by the 
diversion can be minimized through proper administration and conservation 
measures py New Mexico. The facts presented show that users ih New Mexico 
have not fully appropriated the Vermejo River; other water sources are 
available and underutilized. The only water user which could be injured is 
'·' 
- 6 -
the Vermejo Conservancy District. Evidence showeq that its use of water is 
inefficient--in part because the majority of farmers in the district engage in 
farming on a part-time basis. Again, other water is available in the form of 
the Chico Rico River. Third, it would be inequitable to deny Colorado access 




(5) colorado addresses a number of specific points raised in New 
Mexico's exceptions. The gist of those points is that (a) New Mexico has 
twisted the facts to suit its arguments; the Master carefully considered all 
of the evidence presented and the fact that he did not address all of its fine 
points does not diminish the validity of his conclusions. (b) The appendices 
included in New Mexico's brief are improper. They purport to reflect data 
calculated on the basis of Colorado Exhibits 69 and 10: They are internally 
inconsistent and misleading. 
In sum, the Special Master's conclusions are correct--based upon a 
consideration of the equities. 
MOTION TO FILE AMICUS BRIEF: Four New Mexico users of the Vermejo River 
(Kaiser steel Corp., Phelps Dodge Corp., Vermejo Park Corp., and Vermejo 
Conservancy District) move for leave to file an amicus brief in support of New 
Mexico. Arguing that a diversion of water by Colorado would cause them severe 
and irreparable injury, they aver that they should be permitted to file an 
amicus brief • . In that brief they contend that: (1) The Special Master 
misunderstood the evidence; he equated •average• flow with dependable 
predictable flow. (2) He also misunderstood the doctrine of equitable 
apportionment. 
The state of Colorado responds to this motion for leave to file by 
arguing that: (2) The four corporations are already represented by New 





their interests are not adequately protected by New Mexico. In fact, Mr. 
Stillinger, Esq., who is listed as "of counsel" on the amicus brief 
participated in the hearings before the Special Master as a Special Assistant 
Attorney General for New Mexico. ()) The brief is repetitious with the brief 
already filed by New Mexico. (4) Colorado should not be burdened with also 
responding to this amicus brief. 
I 
DISCUSSION: The Master's Repor't seems sound. Although it is extremely 
difficult to gauge the exact worth of his factual conclusions, they seem 
reasonable in the context of the equitable solution suggested. The parties 
may forever dispute the technical aspects of this case but the point remains 
that based upon the law and facts presented, Colorado is entitled to an 
equitable apportionment. Even assuming that the Special Master understated 
____...---....-
the actual threat to New Mexico, his conclusion that a diversion of 4,000 
acre-feet is due Colorado is more than reasonable. This Court has in the past 
generally recognized that ~iority~ ~P?rtionment is_~t controlling; other,L~ 
factors, such as impact on the economy of a state, should be considered. Th~ 
Special ~aster did so in this case. 
The exceptions by New Mexico do not present a serious challenge to the 
~ster's Report. Accordingly, the court should direct the ~ster to draft a 
proposed decree. 
There does not seem to be a compelling need to hear oral argument on the 
-
wide-ranging factual disp..ltes which arose in this case. One might be 
warranted, however, if the Court is concerned with the authority of Colorado 
to prosecute this case on behalf of its citizens. 
As for the motion for leave to file an amicus brief, it should be 
denied. The four entities have been well represented by the defendant, New 





Mexico. Indeed, the crux of New Mexico's position is the impact of the 
proposed diversion on the .four entities. 
There are responses from Colorado on New Mexico's exceptions and the 
motion to file an amicus brief. 
~ 
PJC ~ ~~'(,~ ~, ., 
Schlueter 
I 
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No. 80 Original Motion for Leave to File Reply Brief 
COIDRADO 
v. 
NEW MEXICO, et al. 
SUMMARY: In response to New Mexico's exceptions to the Special Master's 
Report,l Colorado filed a Reply Brief. On June 1, 1982, the Court set New 
Mexico's Exceptions for argument in due course. New Mexico now moves for 
leave to file a response to Colorado's Reply Brief. 
CONTENTIONS: New Mexico argues that Colorado's Reply Brief has presented 
an erroneous legal theory and contains an incomplete discussion of applicable 
precedents. Further, the brief contains distorted facts and an extensive 
response to New Mexico's arguments in its Exceptions. Therefore, New Mexico 
must reply to Colorado's brief in order for the Court to •fairly appreciate 
the significance of the facts and legal points at issue.• 




'· .~ ., 
.LJ"-o...I'-V'-""' ... ""''" £\.U..L.c ::1 v.1.. 1...u.Lo:. \...VUL 1... .::; .f'(u.Le.::; aoes not: spec1a11y address the 
' filing of briefs such as the one offered by New Mexico. However, Rule 9 does 
state that "additional pleadings" may be filed as .the Court directs. Because 
New Mexico's brief will offer some assistance in assessing the merits of this 
original litigation, it seems appropriate to grant the motion. 
I 
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1. Should the principle of priority of appropriation be varied 
in an equitable apportionment of the Vermejo River to provide for 
future developments in pltf at the expense of an existing economy in 
G, ~ ~-~~~~~/~--: 
Does ~e eleventh amendment preclude pltf from obtaining a 
deft? 
2. 
decree in this action solely for the be nefit of one of its citizens? 
' ., 
.. . . 
GRM, 1944. 
te Court. 325U.S. 
water rights to the United 
e rights of the landowners. 
~ho represent their citizens 
tng,12 in no wise interferes 
on by the United States of 
·orks, and facilities. Thus 
' by the United States of 
ly academic so far as the 
ncerned. 
tt if we undertake an ap-
this interstate river, we 
involving administrative 
We noted in Colorado v. 
:lse controversies between 
.tate streams "involve the 
present complicated and 
the possibility of future 
~te expert administration 
of a hard and fast rule. 
priately be composed by 
ursuant to the compact 
on. We say of this case, 
: differences of like nature, 
m and agreement should, 
ttlement, instead of invo-
rer." But the efforts at 
::l. A genuine controversy 
:ance of the case are ap-
ng and enforcing a decree 
tse to perform the impor-
the Constitution. Those 
Missouri v. /Uinoi&, 180 U. S. 
NEBRASKA v. WYOMING. 617 
589 Opinion of the Court. 
considerations did not prevail in Wyoming v. Colorado, 
supra, where an apportionment of the waters of an inter-
state stream was made. Nor did they prevail in the drain-
age canal cases. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U. S. 367, 281 
U. S.l79, 309 U.S. 569,311 U. S.107, 313 U.S. 547. And 
see Sanitary District v. United States, 266 U.S. 405. We \ 
do not believe they should prevail here. 
We recognize the difficulties of the problem. The mat-
ter is a delicate one and extremely complex. To begin 
with we are confronted with the problem of equitable 
apportionment. The Special Master recommen e a e-
cree based oh t hat principle. That was indeed the prin-
ciple adopted by the Court in Wyoming v. Colorado, supra, 
where an apportionment of the waters of an interstate 
stream was made between two States, each of which had 
the rule of appropriation. In speaking of that rule in 
application ___ t9 a controversy~een States the Court, 
through ~r. Justice Van Eevante~said: "T~ Cljrdinal I 
rule of the do-ctrine is that t riority of appro riation ives 
su eriority of rig,ht. Eacnof es;;-' a es applies and 
enforces this rule in her own territory, and it is the one 
to which intending appropriators naturally would turn 
for guidance. The principle on which if proceeds is not 
less applicable to interstate streams and controversies 
than to others. Both States pronounce the rule just and 
reasonable as applied to the natural conditions in that 
region; and to prevent any departure from it the people 
of both incorporated it into their constitutions. It orig-
inated in the customs and usages of the people before 
either State came into existence, and the courts of both 
hold that their constitutional provisions are to be taken 
as recognizing the prior usage rather than as creating a 
new rule. These considerations persuade us that it~li­
cation to suc~Sherepre8ented. cannot 
be-otnertllail·eminently just and equitable to all con-
cerned." 259 U.S. p. 470. And see Wyoming v. Colorad~, 
618 OCTOBER TERM, 1944. 
Opinion of the Court. 325U.8. 
286 U.S. 494; Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 526. 
Since Colorado, Wyoming, and Nebraska are appropria-
tion States, that principle would seem to be equally appli-
cable here. 
That does not mean that there must be a literal a pli-
cation o e prwnty rule. e s ated in o orado v. 
ansas, supra, that in determining whether one State is 
"using, or threatening to use, more than its equitable share 
of the benefits of a stream, · all the fa~tors which create 
equities in favor of one State or t't:e ot~t be w~ighed 
as of the date when the controversy is mooted.'; .. 3·20 U. S. 
p. 394. That case did not involve a controversy between 
two appropriation States. But if an allocation between 
appropriation States is to be just and equitable, strict 
adherence to the priority rule may not be possible.For 
example, tlle"ecoiiomyofaregiOiililay -haveoeen estab-
lished on the basis of 'unior a ro riations. So far as 
possible those es ablishe uses should be protected though 
_..uvfA~~Jf1~itt application o e prionty rule might jeopardize 
b¥.17111""'" them. Apportionment calls for the exercise of an in-
" formed judgment on a consideration of many factors. 
Priorit of appr~ riation is the '!i_ding princi~ But 
physic·a an c rmatic conditions, the consumptive use of 
water in the several sections of the river; the character 
and rate of return flows, the extent of established uses, the 
availability of storage water, the practical effect of waste-
ful uses on downstream areas, the damage to upstream 
areas as compared to the benefits to downstream areas if 
a limitation is imposed on the former-these are all rele-
vant factors. They are merely an illustrative, not an 
exhaustive catalogue. They indicate the nature of the 
problem of apportionment and the delicate adjustment 
of interests which must be made. 
Practical considerations of this order underlie Ne-
braska's concession that the priority rule should not be 
strictly applied to appropriations in Colorado, though 
I ~ ~U<.-a-<-~-
~- _, -~~ 7Lo ~~' ~~..1 
I f" ~--:-: . • . • x.v 
lfp/ss 09/29/82 
MEMORANDUM TO THE FILE 
80 Orig. Colorado v. New Mexico 
Both parties agree that the applicable principle 
is "equitable apportionment", and the Special Master 
purported to apply this doctrine in allocating 4,000 acre 
feet of water from the Vermejo river to Colorado. 
The parties quarrel as to the meaning and 
application of the doctrine. Both agree it is equitable in 
character. New Mexico, however, states that in this case 
all of the equities favor it because the water in this river 
- all of it - had been appropriated for nearly a century by 
New Mexico users. Therefore the "equities" lay with the 
parties (two industries and several public irrigation 
projects) dependent upon the water. The economy of the 
state and the investments of these parties were at issues. 
Colorado insists first that the retention of 4,000 
acre feet would not adversely affect downstream users, and 
apparently the Special Master agreed. Possibly the case 
would turn on whether we accept this finding of the Special 
Master. 
Both parties rely on Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 u.s. 
589 (19 44) (Douglas, J.). The critical language is found on 
pages 617 and 618 of t he opinion - at t ached to this memo. 
Quoting from Justice Van Devanter, in Wyoming v. 
Colorado, 259 U.S. 470, New Mexico argues: 







"The cardinal rule of the doctrine is that 
priority of appropriation gives superiority 
of right. * * * Priority of appropriation is 
the guiding principle"." Nebraska v. Wyoming, 
at pp. 617, 618. 
Colorado responds, relying on language from the 
same opinion in Wyoming v. Colorado that although priority 
of appropriation may be the cardinal rule, "there must [not] 
be a literal application of that rule". p. 618. Justice 
Douglas goes on to quote from Colorado v. Kansas to say that 
"all the factors which create equities in favor of one state 
or the other must be weighed as of the date when the 
controvery is mooted". 320 u.s., at 394. Strict adherence 
to the priority rule may not be possible. 
But after the foregoing qualifications, Justice 
Douglas states: 
"The economy of a region may have been 
established on the basis of junior 
appropriations (as well as senior). So far 
as possible those established uses (in both 
states) should be protected though strict 
application of the priority rule might 
jeopardize them". 
* * * 
If, as New Mexico claims, the burden of proof in 
this case is on Colorado - as it is the plaintiff in this 
action - I am inclined to think New Mexico should prevail. 
It seems to be conceded even by Colorado that there has been 
no actual prior appropriation of any water in Colorado, only 
the in choate right a Colorado state court created for the 
2. 
beneift of a single industry: Colorado Fuel & Iron Steel 





MEMORANDUM TO THE FILE 
80 Orig. Colorado v. New Mexico 
Both parties agree that the applicable principle 
is "equitable apportionment", and the Special Master 
purported to apply this doctrine in allocating 4,000 acre 
feet of water from the Vermejo river to Colorado. 
The parties quarrel as to the meaning and 
application of the doctrine. Both agree it is equitable in 
character. New Mexico, however, states that i.n this case 
all of the equities favor it bec"use the water in this river 
- all of it - had been appropriated for nearly a century by 
New Mexico users. Therefore the "equities" lay with the 
parties (two industries and several public irrigation 
projects) dependent upon the water. The economy of the 
state and the investments of these parties were at issues. 
Colorado insists first that the retention of 4,000 
acre feet wouJd not a~versely affect downstream users, and 
apparently the Special Master agreed. Possibly the case 
would turn on whether we accept this finding of the Special 
Master. 
Both parties rely on Nebraska v. wyoming, 325 u.s. 
589 (1944) (Dougla.s, J.). The critical language is found on 
pages 617 and 618 of the opinion - attached to this memo. 
Quoting from Justice Van Devanter, in wyoming v. 
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"The ca~e of the doctrine is that 
priority of appropriation gives superiority 
of right. * * * Priority of appropriation is 
the guiding principle"." Nebraska v. Wyoming, 
at pp. 617, 618. 
Colorado responds, relying on language from the 
same opinion in wyoming v. Colorado that although priority 
of appropriation may be the cardinal rule, "there must {not] 
be a literal application of that rule". p. 618. Justi.ce 
Douglas goes on to quote from Colorado v. Kansas to say that 
"all the factors which create equities in favor of one state 
or the other must be weighed as of the date when the 
controvery is mooted". 320 u.s., at 394. Strict adherence 
to the priority rule may not be possible. 
But after the foregoing qualifications, Justice 
Douglas states: 
"The economy of a region may have been 
established on the basis of junior 
appropriations (as well as senior). So far 
as possible those established uses (in both 
states) should be protected though strict 
application of the priority rule might 
jeopardize them". 
* * * 
If, as New Mexico claims, the burden of proof in 
this case is on Colorado - as it is the plaintiff in this 
action - I am inclined to think New Mexico should prevail. 
It seems to be conceded even by Colorado that there has been 
no actual prior appropriation of any water in Colorado, only 
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"The ca~le of the doctrine is that 
priority of appropriation gives superiority 
of right. * * * Priority of appropriation is 
the guiding principle"." Nebraska v. Wyoming, 
at Pp. 617, 618. 
Colorado responos, relying on language from the 
same opinion in wyoming v. Colorado that although priority 
ot appropriation may be the cardinal rule, "there must {not] 
be a literal application of that rule". p. 618. Justice 
Douglas goes on to quote from Colorado v. Kansas to say that 
"all the factors which create equities in favor of one state 
or the other must be weighed as of the date when the 
controvery is mooted". 320 u.s., at 394. Strict adherence 
to the priority rule may not be possible. 
But after the foregoing qualifications, Justice 
Douglas states: 
"The economy of a region may have been 
established on the basis of junior 
approPriations (as well as senior). So far 
as possible those established uses (in both 
states) should be protected though strict 
application of the priority rule might 
jeopardize them". 
* * * 
If, as New Mexico claims, the burden of proof in 
this case is on Colorado - as it is the plaintiff in this 
action - I am inclined to think New Mexico should prevail. 
It seems to be conceded even by Colorado that there has been 
no actual prior appropriation of any water in Colorado, only 
the in choate right a Colorado state court created tor the 
2. 
beneift of a single industry: Colorado Fuel & Iron Steel 






To: Mr. Justice Pow1 
From: Jim 
r+&. 1 f<tv . 
L. e\ . , . 1'1 ,.s .r. 
Yt,.~t'"'- hJ ~~. 
RANDUM 
Re: Colorado v. New Mexico, No. 80 Original 
Regarding the standard of review this Court uses in reviewing a 
master's factual findings, the Court in United States v. Raddatz, 
447 u.s. 667, 683 n.ll (1980), stated: "In original cases, as under 
the Federal Magistrates Act, the master's recommendations are 
advisory only, yet this Court regularly acts on the basis of the 
~ ....... 
master's report and exceptions thereto." This is dictum, and the 
--==---
Court gives no citation in support, but as a descriptive matter, I 
think the Court is right. As a policy matter, I think the Court 
should give great deference to the master's factual findings. 
. . 
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Dear Chief: 
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October 12, 1982 
/ 
This note will follow up our telephone conversation of 
yesterday afternoon. 
I feel that No. 80 Original should not be assigned to 
me, and should be reassigned. According to my notes, there 
were five votes (CJ, WJB, BRW, TM, and WHR) to vacate and 
remand; two votes to sustain the objections of New Mexico 
(LP and SOC); and two to overrule the objections of New 
Mexico (JPS and HAB). I therefore am not a member of the 
majority. 




The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
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From: Justice Marshall 
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Recirculated: ________ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
STATE OF COLORADO, PLAINTIFF v. STATE OF 
NEW MEXICO AND ROBERT K. CORGIN, ATTORNEY 
GENERAL OF NEW MEXICO 
ON BILL OF COMPLAINT 
No. 80, Orig. Decided November-, 1982 
JusTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case concerns the proper apportionment between 
New Mexico and Colorado of the water of an interstate river. 
The water of the Vermejo River is at present fully appropri-
ated by users in New Mexico. Colorado seeks to divert wa-
ter for future uses. Invoking this Court's original jurisdic-
tion under Article 3, § 2 of the Constitution, Colorado 
brought this action for an equitable apportionment of the wa-
ter of Vermejo River. A Special Master appointed by the 
Court recommended that Colorado be permitted a diversion 
of 4,000 acre-feet per year. The case is before us on New 
Mexico's exceptions to the Special Master's report. 
I 
The Vermejo River is a small, nonnavigable river that 
originates in the snow-belt of the Rocky Mountains in south-
ern Colorado and flows southeasterly into New Mexico for a 
distance of roughly 55 miles before it joins the Canadian 
River. The major portion of the river is located in New 
Mexico. The Colorado portion consists of three tributaries 
that combine to form the Vermejo River proper approxi-
mately one mile below the Colorado-New Mexico border. At 
present there are no uses of the water of the Vermejo River 
in Colorado, and no use or diversion has ever been made in 
Colorado. In New Mexico, by contrast, farmers and indus-
trial users have diverted water from the Vermejo for many 
years. In 1941 a New Mexico state court issued a decree 
.. 
I 
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apportioning the water of the Vermejo River among the vari-
ous New Mexico users. 1 
In 1975, a Colorado corporation, Colorado Fuel and Iron 
Steel Corporation ("C.F. & 1."), obtained in Colorado state 
court a conditional right to divert 75 cubic feet per second 
from the headwaters of the Vermejo River. 2 C.F. & I. pro-
posed a transmountain diversion of the water to a tributary 
of the Purgatoire River in Colorado to be used for industrial 
development and other purposes. Upon learning of this de-
cree, the four principal New Mexico users-Phelps Dodge 
Corporation ("Phelps Dodge"), Kaiser Steel Corporation 
("Kaiser Steel"), Vermejo Park Corporation ("Vermejo 
Park"), and the Vermejo Conservancy District ("Conser-
vancy District"}-filed suit in United States District Court 
for the District of New Mexico, seeking to enjoin any diver-
sion by C.F. & I. that would violate their senior rights. On 
January 16, 1978, the District Court enjoined C.F. & I. from 
diverting any water from the Vermejo River in derogation of 
the senior water rights of New Mexico users. 3 The court 
found that under the doctrine of prior appropriation, which 
both New Mexico and Colorado recognize, 4 the New Mexico 
1 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. W. S. Land and Cattle Co., No. 7201 (D.C. Cty. 
Colfax 1941). 
2 In re the Application for Water Rights of C. F. & I. Corp., No. W-3961 
(Dist. Ct., W. Div. No.2, June 20, 1975). 
8 Kaiser Steel Corporation et al. v. C.F. & I. Steel Corporation, Civil 
No. 76-244 (D.N.M. 1978). The injunction was not based on a determina-
tion of the right of the two states under the law of equitable apportion-
ment, since neither Colorado nor New Mexico was a party to the action. 
• N .M. Const. Art. XVI, § 2; Colo. Const. Art. XVI, § 5, 6. The admin-
istration of water rights in each state is governed by statute. Colo. Rev. 
Stat. § 37-92-101 et seq. (1973); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-1-1 et seq. (1978). 
The prior appropriation doctrine and the riparian doctrine are the two 
basic doctrines governing the rights to the use of water. Under the prior 
appropriation doctrine, recognized in most of the western states, water 
rights are acquired by diverting water and applying it for a beneficial pur-
pose. A distinctive feature of the prior appropriation doctrine is the rule 
of priority, under which the relative rights of water users are ranked in the 
order of their seniority. Under the riparian doctrine, recognized primar-
------------ - -
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COLORADO v. NEW MEXICO 3 
users were entitled to have their needs fully satisfied because 
their appropriation was first in time. C.F. & I. filed a notice 
of appeal, and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has 
stayed its proceedings during the pendency of this case be-
fore us. 
In June 1978 Colorado moved for leave to file an original 
complaint in this Court. New Mexico opposed the motion. 
On April 16, 1979, we granted Colorado's motion and ap-
pointed the Honorable Ewing T. Kerr, Senior Judge of the 
United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, as 
Special Master in this case. After a lengthy trial involving 
an extensive presentation of evidence, the Special Master 
submitted a report to the Court on January 9, 1982. There-
port was accepted for filing on February 22, 1982. 
The Special Master found that most of the water of the 
Vermejo River is consumed by the · New Mexico users and · 
that very little, if any, reaches the confluence with the Cana-
dian River. He thus recognized that strict application of the 
rule of priority would not permit Colorado any diversion 
since the entire available supply is needed to satisfy the de-
mands of appropriators in New Mexico with senior rights. 
Nevertheless, applying the principle of equitable apportion-
ment established in our prior cases, he recommended permit-
ting Colorado a transmountain diversion of 4,000 acre-feet 5 
ily in the eastern, midwestern and southern states, the owner of land 
contiguous to a watercourse is entitled to have the stream flow by or 
through his land undiminished in quantity and unpolluted in quality, except 
that any riparian proprietor may make whatever use of the water that is 
reasonable with respect to the needs of other appropriators. 
Appropriative rights do not depend on land ownership and are acquired 
and maintained by actual use. Riparian rights, by contrast, originate 
from land ownership and remain vested even if unexercized. Appropri-
ative rights are fixed in quantity; riparian rights are variable depending on 
streamflow and subject to the reasonable uses of others. See generally 1 
R. Clark, Waters and Water Rights (1967); W. Hutchins, Selected Prob-
lems in the Law of Water Rights in the West (U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, 
Misc. Pub. No. 418) (1942); 1 W. Hutchins, Water Rights Laws in the 
Nineteen Western States (U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, Misc. Pub. No. 
1206) (1971). 
6 An acre-foot is a volumetric measurement which means the amount of 
4 COLORADO v. NEW MEXICO 
of water per year from the headwaters of the Vermejo River. 
He stated: 
"It is the opinion of the Master that a transmountain 
diversion would not materially affect the appropriations 
granted by New Mexico for users downstream. A thor-
ough examination of the existing economies in New Mex-
ico convinces the Master that the injury to New Mexico, 
if any, will be more than offset by the benefit to Colo-
rado." Report of the Special Master, p. 23. 
Explaining his conclusion, the Special Master noted that 
any injury to New Mexico would be restricted to the Conser-
vancy District, the user in New Mexico furthest downstream, 
since there was sufficient water in the Vermejo River for the 
three other principal New Mexico water users, Vermejo 
Park, Kaiser Steel, and Phelps Dodge. 6 He further found 
that the "Vermejo Conservancy District has never been an 
economically feasible operation." Ibid. 
The Special Master's recommendation appears to rest on 
two alternative grounds: first, that New Mexico could com-
pensate for some or all the Colorado diversion through rea-
sonable water conservation measures; 7 and second, that the 
water required to cover one acre of ground one foot deep. One acre foot 
equals 43,560 cubic feet or 325,900 gallons of water. 
• The Conservancy District is the largest user of water from the 
Vermejo River in New Mexico. It consists of over 60 farms irrigated by 
an extensive system of canals and reservoirs. The U. S. Maxwell Wildlife 
Refuge is also located within the District. In the early 1950's the District 
was part of a large reclamation project funded by the federal Government. 
Vermejo Park diverts water primarily to irrigate land used to grow hay 
for its cattle operation. Kaiser Steel uses water primarily for its coal facil-
ities. Phelps Dodge leases its rights to Kaiser Steel and to the C.S. 
Springer Cattle Company. 
7 This is a fair reading of the Special Master's conclusion that New Mex-
ico users would not be "materially affected" by the recommended diver-
sion. While the report does not expressly state that Colorado's diversion 
might be offset by reasonable conservation efforts, it does refer specifically 
to the waste and inefficiency of the Conservancy District's system of water 
canals. Special Master's Report, at 23, 8. In addition, in its second ex-
--~-----·-----·-----~---·-
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injury, if any, to New Mexico would be outweighed by the 
benefit to Colorado from the diversion. In its various excep-
tions to his report, New Mexico challenges the Special Mas-
ter's interpretation of the law of equitable apportionment. 
New Mexico maintains that the rule of priority should be 
strictly applied in this case to preclude Colorado from divert-
ing any water from the Vermejo River. New Mexico also 
challenges the factual bases of the Special Master's conclu-
sions that the recommended diversion would not materially 
affect New Mexico users and that any harm to New Mexico 
would be offset by the benefits to Colorado. 8 
ception to the report New Mexico acknowledges that the Special Master 
based his conclusion that New Mexico users would not be materially af-
fected on certain findings concerning waste and inefficiency within the 
Conservancy District. 
8 New Mexico also contends that Colorado is improperly suing directly 
and solely for the benefit of a private individual-C.F. & I.-in violation of 
the Eleventh Amendment, and that Colorado's suit is barred by laches. 
We find no merit to·these claims. 
Because the SU!.te of Colorado has a substantial interest in the outcome 
of this suit, New Mexico may not invoke its Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity from federal actions by citizens of another State. The portion of the 
Vermejo River in Colorado is owned by the State in trust for its citizens. 
Colo. Const. Article XVI, Section 5. While C.F. & I. will most likely be 
the primary user of any water diverted from the V ermejo River, other Col-
orado citizens may jointly use the water or purchase water rights in the 
future. In any event, Colorado surely has a sovereign interest in the ben-
eficial effects of a diversion on the general prosperity of the State. Faced 
with a similar set of circumstances in Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 99 
(1907), we concluded that "[t]he controversy rises ... above a mere ques-
tion oflocal private right and involves the matter of state interest and must 
be considered from that standpoint." 
We also conclude that Colorado is not barred by laches from seeking an 
equitable apportionment. For the reasons that we elaborate below, pp. 
--, post, we hold that under some circumstances the countervailing equi-
ties supporting a diversion of water for a future use in one state may justify 
the detriment suffered by existing users in another state. Therefore the 
mere fact that Colorado has no existing uses of the waters of the Vermejo 
River and that current users in New Mexico may suffer some detriment 
from a diversion does not bar Colorado's suit for an equitable apportion-
ment for future uses. These circumstances, however, do bear on the bur-
·----···------.,.,...---
. . ~. 
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We conclude that the criteria relied upon by the Special 
Master comport with the doctrine of equitable apportionment 
as it has evolved in. our prior cases. We thus reject New 
Mexico's contention that the Special Master was required to 
focus exclusively on the rule of priority. However, theRe-
port of the Special Master does not contain sufficient factual 
findings to enable us to assess the correctness of the Special 
Master's application of the principle of equitable apportion-
ment to the facts of this case. We therefore remand with in-
structions to the Special Master to make further findings of 
fact. 
II 
Equitable apportionment is the doctrine of federal common 
law that governs disputes between states concerning their 
rights to use the water of an interstate stream. Kansas v. 
Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 98 (1907); Connecticut v. Massachu-
setts, 282 U. S. 660, 670-671 (1931). It is a flexible doctrine 
which calls for "the exercise of an informed judgment on a 
consideration of many factors" to secure a "just and equita-
ble" allocation. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U. S. 589, 618 
(1945). We have stressed that in arriving at "the delicate 
adjustment of interests which must be made," ibid., we must 
consider all relevant factors, including: 
"physical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of 
water in the several sections of the river, the character 
and rate of return flows, the extent of established uses, 
the availability of storage water, the practical effect of 
wasteful uses on downstream areas, [and] the damage to 
upstream areas as compared to the benefits to down-
stream areas if a limitation is imposed on the former." 
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U. S. 589, 618 (1945). 
den of proof that Colorado must satisfy to justify the possible disruption of 
existing uses. See pp. -, post. A contrary conclusion is not dictated 
by Washington v. Oregon, 297 U. S. 517, 528 (1936), or Colorado v. Kan-
sas, 320 U. S. 383, 394 (1943) (dictum), which merely require established 
users or holders of water rights to exercise diligence in protecting their 
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Our aim is always to secure a just and equitable apportion-
ment "without quibbling over formulas." New Jersey v. 
New York, 283 U. S. 336, 343 (1931). 
The laws of the contending states concerning intrastate 
water disputes are an important consideration governing eq-
uitable apportionment. When, as in this case, both states 
recognize the doctrine of prior appropriation, priority be-
comes the "guiding principle" in an allocation between com-
peting states. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U. S., at 618. 
But state law is not controlling. Rather, the just apportion-
ment of interstate waters is a question of federal law that de-
pends "upon a consideration of the pertinent laws of the con-
tending States and all other relevant facts." Connecticut v. 
Massachusetts, 282 U. S., at 670-671 (emphasis added). 
In reaching his recommendation the Special Master did not 
focus exclusively on the rule of priority, but considered other 
factors such as the efficiency of current uses in New Mexico 
and the balance of benefits to Colorado and harm to New 
Mexico. New Mexico contends that it is improper to con-
sider these other factors. It maintains that this Court has 
strictly applied the rule of priority when apportioning water 
between states adhering to the prior appropriation doctrine, 
and has departed from that rule only to protect an existing 
economy built upon junior appropriations. Since there is no 
existing economy in Colorado dependent upon the use of wa-
ter from the Vermejo River, New Mexico contends that the 
rule of priority is controlling. We disagree with this inflex-
ible interpretation of the doctrine of equitable 
apportionment. 
Our prior cases clearly establish that equitable apportion-
ment will protect only those rights to water that are "reason-
ably acquired and applied." Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 
U. S. 419, 484 (1922). Especially in those Western states 
where water is scarce, "[t]here must be no waste ... of the 
'treasure' of a river. . . . Only diligence and good faith will 
keep the privilege alive." Washington v. Oregon, 297 U. S. 
517, 527 (1936). Thus, wasteful or inefficient uses will not be 
protected. See ibid.; Nebraska v. Wyoming, supra, at 618. 
Similarly, concededly senior water rights will be deemed for-
8 COLORADO v. NEW MEXICO 
feited or substantially diminished where the rights have not 
been exercised or asserted with reasonable diligence. 
Washington v. Oregon, 297 U. S., at 527-528 (1936); Colo-
rado v. Kansas, 320 U. S. 383, 394 (1943). 9 
We have invoked equitable apportionment not only to re-
quire the reasonably efficient use of water, but also to impose 
on states an affirmative duty to conserve and augment the 
water supply of an interstate stream. In Wyoming v. Colo-
rado, Wyoming brought suit to prevent a proposed diversion 
by Colorado from the Laramie River. This Court calculated 
the dependable supply available to both states, subtracted 
the senior Wyoming uses, and permitted Colorado to divert 
an amount not exceeding the balance. 10 In calculating the 
dependable supply we placed on each state the duty to em-
ploy "financially and physically feasible" measures "adapted 
to conserving and equalizing the natural flow." 259 U: S., 
at 484 (emphasis added). Adopting a position similar to New 
Mexico's in this case, Wisconsin objected to a requirement 
8 The requirement that water use be reasonably efficient and diligent is 
not a departure from the prior appropriation doctrine. Rather, the re-
quirement reflects a fundamental tenet of the prior appropriation doctrine 
that "beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit of the 
right to the use of water." 1 R. Clark, supra, at§ 19.2, p. 86. Under the 
principle of beneficial use, water rights will be forfeited upon non-use or 
abandonment, and the right to use water is limited to those uses that are 
reasonably efficient. !d., at§§ 51.8, 19.2. See also W. Hutchins, supra, 
at 169-173, 306-309, 316--320. 
10 This description is only roughly accurate, since we did not rigidly fol-
low this procedure in apportioning the Laramie River, but instead de-
parted from a strict application of the rule of priority in numerous respects. 
For instance, our decree in Colorado v. Wyoming granted Colorado an un-
qualified right to divert 22,500 acre-feet, even though there were Wyoming 
appropriations senior to the Colorado appropriations underlying the 22,500 
acre-feet grant. 259 U. S., at 489-490. In addition, we granted to Colo-
rado priority to divert a total of 37,750 acre-feet, even though some of the 
underlying appropriations were junior to a number of Wyoming appropria-
tions. Id., at 495-496. The effect was to guarantee water to junior ap-
propriators in Colorado to the potential detriment of senior appropriators 
downstream in Wyoming. See 2 R. Clark, Waters and Water Rights 
§ 132.4 (1967). 
·' 
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that it employ conservation measures to facilitate Colorado's 
proposed uses. The answer we gave is especially relevant to 
this case: 
"The question here is not what one state should do for 
the other, but how each should exercise her relative 
rights in the waters of this interstate stream. . . . Both 
states recognize that conservation within practicable 
limits is essential in order that needless waste may be 
prevented and the largest feasible use may be secured. 
This comports with the allpervading spirit of the doc-
trine of appropriation and takes appropriate heed of the 
natural necessities out of which it arose. We think that 
doctrine lays on each of these states a duty to exercise 
her right reasonably and in a manner calculated to con-
serve the common supply .. " Ibid. 11 
We conclude that it is entirely appropriate to consider the 
extent to which reasonable conservation measures by New 
Mexico might offset the proposed Colorado diversion and 
thereby minimize any injury to New Mexico users. Simi-
larly, it is appropriate to consider whether Colorado has un-
dertaken reasonable steps to minimize the amount of diver-
sion that will be required. 
In addition, we have held that in an equitable apportion-
ment of interstate waters it is proper to weigh the harms and 
benefits to competing states. In Kansas v. Colorado, 
supra, where we first announced the doctrine of equitable 
apportionment, we found that users in Kansas were injured 
by Colorado's upstream diversions from the Arkansas River. 
206 U. S., at 11~114, 117. Yet we declined to grant any re-
lief to Kansas on the ground that the great benefit to ·colo-
rado outweighed the detriment to Kansas. !d., at 100-101, 
11~114, 117. Similarly, in Nebraska v. Wyoming, supra, 
u We thus required Wyoming to enhance and equalize the water supply 
through "practicable storage and conservation" measures, such as the use 
of storage facilities similar to those already in use in Wyoming. 259 U. S., 
at 485. 
10 COLORADO v. NEW MEXICO 
we held that water rights in Wyoming and Nebraska, which 
under state law were senior, had to yield to the "countervail-
ing equities" of an established economy in Colorado even 
though it was based on junior appropriations. 325 U. S., at 
622. We noted that the rule of priority should not be strictly 
applied where it "would work more hardship" on the junior 
user "than it would bestow benefits" on the senior user. /d., 
at 619. See also Washington v. Oregon, supra, 297 U. S., at 
522. The same principle is applicable in balancing the bene-
fits of a diversion for proposed uses against the possible 
harms to existing uses. See, e. g., Colorado v. Wyoming, 
supra (placing upon Wyoming, the state with senior water 
rights, a duty to conserve water in order to facilitate a diver-
sion for a proposed use in Colorado); Connecticut v. Massa-
chusetts, supra; New Jersey v. New York, supra. 12 
We recognize that the equities supporting the protection of 
existing economies will often be compelling. The harm that 
may result from disrupting established uses is typically cer-
tain and immediate, whereas the potential benefits from a 
proposed diversion may be speculative and remote. Under 
some circumstances, however, the countervailing equities 
supporting a future use in one state may justify the detri-
ment to existing users in another state. This may be the 
case, for example, where the state seeking a diversion dem-
onstrates that the benefits of the diversion substantially out-
weigh the harm that might result. This approach comports 
12 In Connecticut v. Massachusetts we declined to enjoin Massachusetts' 
proposed diversion for future uses. We took into account the impending 
"serious water shortage" in the Boston area and the absence of ''real or 
substantial injury or damage" to Connecticut. 282 U. S. 660, 664, 672 
(1931). Although Connecticut v. Massachusetts, as well as New Jersey v. 
New York, 283 U. S. 336 (1931), involved states that follow the riparian 
rather than the prior appropriation doctrine, see note 4, supra, our alloca-
tion of water for future uses rested on the federal common law of equitable 
apportionment, which, as we made clear, "is not governed by the same 
rules of [state] law that are applied for the solution of similar questions of 
private right." Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U. S., at 670; see also 
New Jersey v. New York, supra, at 342-343. Nothing in those two cases 
suggested that the apportionment of water for future uses in any way de-
pended on the adherence of both states to the riparian doctrine. 
t. 
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with our emphasis on flexibility in equitable apportionment 
and also accords sufficient protection to existing uses. 
We conclude, therefore, that in the determination of an eq-
uitable apportionment of the water of the Vermejo River the 
rule of priority is not the sole criterion. While the equities 
supporting the protection of established, senior uses are sub-
stantial, it is also appropriate to consider additional factors 
relevant to a just apportionment, such as the conservation 
measures available to both states and the balance of harm 
and benefit that might result from the diversion sought by 
Colorado. 
III 
Applying the doctrine of equitable apportionment, the Spe-
cial Master recommended that Colorado be permitted to di-
vert 4,000 acre-feet of water per year from the headwaters of 
the Vermejo River. Because all of the water of the Vermejo 
River is currently consumed by New Mexico appropriators, 
the recommended diversion would necessarily reduce the 
amount of water available to New Mexico. 
In explaining the basis for his recommendation, the Special 
Master stated that the diversion would not "materially af-
fect" existing New Mexico appropriations. This conclusion 
appears to reflect certain assumptions about the ability of 
New Mexico users to implement water conservation mea-
sures. See pp. --, ante. The Special Master also con-
cluded that any injury to New Mexico would be "more than 
offset" by the benefits to Colorado. Report of Special Mas-
ter, p. 23. Both the availability of conservation measures 
and a weighing of the harm and benefits that would result 
from the diversion are factors relevant to the determination 
of a just and equitable apportionment. However, the Spe-
cial Master did not clearly state the factual findings support-
ing his reliance on these factors. Accordingly, we remand 
for additional factual findings. In particular, we request 
specific findings concerning the following areas: 13 
18 An additional issue is the proper allocation of the burden of proof with 
regard to these questions. Our cases establish that a state seeking to pre-
'· 
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(1) the existing uses of water from the Vermejo River, and 
the extent to which present levels of use reflect current or 
historical water shortages or the failure of existing users to 
develop their uses diligently; 
(2) the available supply of water from the Vermejo River, 
accounting for factors such as variations in streamflow, the 
needs of current users for a continuous supply, the possibil-
ities of equalizing and enhancing the water supply through 
water storage and conservation, and the availability of sub-
stitute sources of water to relieve the demand for water from 
the Vermejo River; 
vent or enjoin a diversion by another state bears the burden of proving 
that the diversion will cause it "real or substantial injury or damage." 
Connecticut v. Massachusetts, supra, 282 U. S., at 672. See also New 
Jersey v. New York, 283 U. S., at 344--345; Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S., 
at 117; Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U. S., at 393--394. This rule applies even 
if the state seeking to prevent or enjoin a diversion is the nominal defend-
ant in a lawsuit. In Colorado v. Kansas, for instance, Colorado sued Kan-
sas seeking to enjoin further lawsuits by Kansas water users against Colo-
rado users. Although Kansas was the defendant, we granted Colorado an 
injunction based Kansas' failure to sustain the burden of showing that the 
Colorado diversions had "worked a serious detriment to the substantial in-
terests of Kansas." 320 U. S., at 400; see also id., at 389--390. 
New Mexico must therefore bear the initial burden of showing that a di-
version by Colorado will cause substantial injury to the interests of New 
Mexico. In this case New Mexico has met its burden since any diversion 
by Colorado, unless offset by New Mexico at its own expense, will neces-
sarily reduce the amount of avaiilable to New Mexico users. 
The burden has therefore shifted to Colorado to establish that a diver-
sion should nevertheless be permitted under the principle of equitable 
apportionment. Thus, with respect to whether reasonable conservation 
measures by New Mexico will offset the loss of water due to Colorado's di-
version, or whether the benefit to Colorado from the diversion will sub-
stantially outweigh the possible harm to New Mexico, Colorado will bear 
the burden of proof. It must show, in effect, that without such a diversion 
New Mexico would be using "more than its equitable share of the benefits 
of a stream." Id., at 394. Moreover, Colorado must establish not only 
that its claim is of a "serious magnitude," but also that its position is sup-
ported by "clear and convincing evidence." Connecticut v. Massachu-
setts, 282 U. S., at 669. See also Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U. S., at 393; 
Washington v. Oregon, 297 U. S., at 522. 
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(3) the extent to which reasonable conservation measures 
in both states might eliminate waste and inefficiency in the 
use of water from the Vermejo River; 
( 4) the precise nature of the proposed interim and ultimate 
use in Colorado of water from the Vermejo River, and the 
benefits that would result from a diversion to Colorado; 
(5) the injury, if any, that New Mexico would likely suffer 
as a result of any such diversion, taking into account the ex-
tent to which reasonable conservation measures could offset 
the diversion. 14 
IV 
The flexible doctrine of equitable apportionment clearly ex-
tends to a state's claim to divert water for future uses. 
Whether such a 'diversion should be permitted will turn on an 
examination of all factors relevant to a just apportionment. 
It is proper, therefore, to consider factors such as the extent 
to which reasonable conservation measures by existing users 
can offset the reduction in supply due to diversion, and 
whether the be~efits to the state seeking the diversion sub-
stantially outweigh the harm to existing uses in another 
state. We remand for specific factual findings relevant to 
determining the just and equitable apportionment of the wa-
ter of the Vermejo River between Colorado and New Mexico. 
It is so ordered. 
1
• The Special Master may make any other factual findings that he con-
siders relevant. Additional hearings may be held, although they may be 
unnecessary in light of the extensive evidence already presented at trial. 
Upon remand, the Special Master is free to reaffirm or modify his original 
recommendation on the basis of the evidence and applicable principles of 
equitable apportionment. 
,. 
November 16, 1.982 
80 Oriq. Colordao v. New Mexico 
Dear Thurgood: 
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CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE w .. . .J . BRENNAN, .JR . 
j\npuntt Qlttnd ttf firt ~b: j\taft,g 
~ZU¥Jringhm. ~. Ql. 2ll~'l~ 
November 19, 1982 
Re: Colorado v. New Mexico, No. 80-0rig. 
Dear Thurgood: 
I agree. However, I would like to see just a bit 
stronger language on the importance of protecting 
existing economies. I suggest that the paragraph running 
from page 10 to page 11 could be changed to the 
following: 
We recognize that the equities supporting 
the protection of existing economies will usually 
be compelling. The harm that may result from 
disrupting established uses is typically certain 
and immediate, whereas the potential benefits 
from a proposed diversion may be speculative and 
remote. Protection of existing economies, 
however, does not require that users be permitted 
to continue in unreasonably wasteful or 
inefficient practices. In such a situation, the 
countervailing equities supporting a future use 
in one state may justify a oetriment to existing 
users in another state. This approach comports 
with our emphasis on flexibility in equitable 
apportionment and also accords sufficient 











CHAMBERS OF" . 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . R E HNQUIST 
~n.prtnu <!fonrl of flrt ~tb .§taits-
jir aglying Lm. ~. <!}. 2lJ c?)!. ~ 
November 22, 1982 
Re: No. 80 Orig. Colorado v. New Mexico 
Dear Thurgood: 
You probably remember that the three "Westerners" at 
Conference took positions in varying de grees more favorable 
to New Mexico in this case than some other Members of the 
Conference. While I don't think that Byron, Sandra, and I 
are in complete agreement as to how we would decide the 
case, I did run the suggestions contained in this letter by 
them in order to make sure that they would not disapprove of 
your including them if you were inclined to do so. 
I agree with almost all of your draft and will be happy 
to join if you can· see your way clear to accommodating the 
following relatively minor suggestions. · My principal 
concern, which motivated this letter, is the implication in 
the Master's Report that one of the three reasons why 
Colorado was entitled to prevail was that the Vermejo 
originated in Colorado. Your present draft does not approve 
that suggestion, but I would like to see it expressly 
disapproved because I think it is inconsistent with our 
earlier cases. I would also like to persuade you to make 
several other minor changes in the language. If you are 
agreeable, I will join your opinion. 
1. Page 4, paragraph beginning "The Special Master's 
••• ". Recite that there are three grounds, not two, and 
that one is that "each [state] is entitled to a benefit from 
the interstate river flowing within its borders." Report of 
the Special Master, p. 8. 
2. Page 6, paragraph beginning at the top of the page. 
Revise the first two sentences to read something like the 
following: 
- 2 -
"We conclude that two of the three criteria 
relied upon by the Special Master comport with the 
doctrine of equitable apportionment as it is 
evolved in our prior cases. While we reject the 
Special Master's view that Colorado was entitled 
to some share of the waters of the Vermejo simply 
because it rose in Colorado, we also reject New 
Mexico's contention that the Special Master was 
required to focus exclusively on the rule of 
priority." 
3. Page 8, first sentence in first full paragraph on 
page: Insert after the words "duty to" in the third line of 
the paragraph the phrase "take reasonable steps to." 
Delete or revise footnote 9, which I think presently 
reflects an inaccurate view of western water law. I don't 
think "beneficial use" is a synonym for "reasonably 
efficient and diligent" use, at least in many western 
states, and forfeiture upon non-use or abandonment is a much 
more limited concept than inefficient use of water. 
4. Page 13, final sentence in footnote 14: I would 
like to see this sentence either deleted or modified, 
because it seems to me that in its present form it is 
somewhat "loaded." If it is to be kept in, why not 
something like this? "Upon remand, the Special Master is 
free to reaffirm his original recommendation or to make a 
different recommendation on the basis of the evidence and 
applicable principles of equitable apportionment." 
As I said earlier, I have shown a copy of this letter 
to Byron and to Sandra, to make sure that my suggestions 
would not trouble them. 
Sincerely/ 
Justice Marshall 
.®tttrrtntt <!}ourt cf 14t ~ittb j;tait.s' 
'~lht.s-!p:ngtcn,~. <If. 2l1.;t~~ , 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
November 24, 1982 
No. 80 Orig. Colorado v. New Mexico 
Dear Thurgood, 
If you are willing to include the change 
suggested by Bill Brennan, and the changes suggested 
by Bill Rehnquist, I could join your opinion, although 
I would probably also write a separate concurring 
opinion to explain why I join. 
Justice Marshall 











Dear Thurgood : ~ 
At Conference I expressed views similiar to those 
of Sandra. 
',r."' 
T. have note1 her letter to you of November 24, and 








JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
~u:p:rtmt Q}llu:rl of tlft ·~mttb ~taUs 
jilrutfringLm, ~- c.q. 2.0,?~~ 
November 29, 1982 
Re: No. 80 Orig. Colorado· v. · New Mexico 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
v 
Since others have referred to my letter to Thurgood, 







.JUSTICE WH. J . BRENNAN, JR. 
.inpunu Qftturlttf flrt ~b ,.§taft~ 
~ufri:nghrn. ~. Q}. 21l~Jl.~ 
November 30, 1982 
v 
Re: Colorado v. New Mexico, No. 80-0rig. 
Dear Thurgood: 










..JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
j;u:puntt <!J onrl cf tltt ~tb .;§hrlts-
.ru;frittgLm. ~· <!J. 20gtJ!.~ 
December 4, 1982 
Re: No. 80-0rig. Colorado v. New Mexico 
.Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, \ JV'} 
\}'-
Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
~ttprtntt QJourl of flrt ~b ..§tN.tt$' 
'JifuJrhtghm. ~- OJ. 2ll.;t~.;l 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE w ... .J. BRENNAN, .JR. 
6 December 1982 
Re: Colorado v. New Mexico, No. 80-0rig. 
Dear Thurgood: 
I am still with you. 
Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
Since'rely, 




j;u:pumt <lJo-nrl o-f tlrt ~tb j;tatts-
~lritt-ghrn. ~.(!f. 2llgt~,S 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE December 6, 1982 
Re: 80 Orig. - Colorado v. New Mexico 
Dear Thurgood, 











.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
~uprttm aJttttrlcf flrt ~h ~hrlt.s­
'Jfa.s-lfittghm. ~. <!l. 2n~~,-
December 7' 1982 
Re: 80 Original - Colorado v. New ~co 
Dear 'lliurgood: 




Cbpies to the Conference 
-~ . \ 
,· 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
imvuutt <!feud o-f tltl' ~ttiitb ,iihutg 
.. aglfhtgtlttt. ~. Q}. 2ll~'!~ 
December 7, 1982 
Re: No. 80 Original - Colorado v. New Mexico 
Dear Thurgood: 
I shall go along. 
recirculation of December 3. 
Please join me in your 
Sincerely, 
Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
' . 
1st DRAFT 








From: Justice O'Connor 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
STATE OF COLORADO, PLAINTIFF v. STATE OF 
NEW MEXICO AND ROBERT K. CORGIN, ATTORNEY 
GENERAL OF NEW MEXICO 
ON BILL OF COMPLAINT 
No. 80, Orig. Decided December-, 1982 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in the judgment. 
The doctrine of prior appropriation includes the require-
ment that the appropriator's use of water be beneficial and 
reasonable. What is reasonable, of course, does not admit of 
ready definition, being dependent upon the particular facts 
and circumstances of each case. In this case, the Special 
Master has cast an accusatory finger at the Vermejo Conser-
vancy District, concluding that "[t]he system of canals used 
to transport the water to the fields is inefficient." Report of 
the Special Master, p. 8. 
Undoubtedly, there is evidence in the record indicating 
that large losses of water occur through seepage and evapo-
ration in transporting waters of the Vermejo through open 
ditches for irrigation and stock watering. Tr. 1315. It is a 
leap, however, from observing that large losses occur to con-
cluding, as Colorado would have the Court do, that the prac-
tices of the Conservancy District are wasteful or unreason-
able. As the Court observes, ante, at 8, 9, the extent of the 
duty to conserve that may be placed upon the user is limited 
to measures that are "financially and physically feasible," 
Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U. S. 419, 484 (1922), and "within 
practicable limits." Ibid. 1 Nevertheless, in concluding that 
'It is significant to note that in Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U. S. 419 
(1922), upon which the Court relies for the proposition that an affirmative 
duty to conserve may be imposed on the States, ante, at 8, the Wyoming 
appropriators already had storage facilities in place for equalizing the riv-
er's natural flow. In answering Wyoming's objection that she should not 
:~ ··' 
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the Conservancy District's distribution system is "inef-
ficient," the Special Master made no factual finding that im-
proved economy in that system is within the practicable 
means available to the District. 2 
Colorado would have the Court assess the Conservancy 
District's "waste" and "inefficiency" by a new yardstick-
i. e., not by comparing the economic gains to the District 
with the costs of achieving greater efficiency, but by compar-
ing the "inefficiency" of New Mexico's uses with the relative 
benefits to Colorado of a new use. The Special Master has 
succumbed to this suggestion. His recommendation that 
Colorado be permitted a diversion embodies the judgment 
that, because Colorado can, in some unidentified sense, make 
"better" use of the waters of the Vermejo, New Mexico may 
be forced to change her present uses. 
Today the Court has also gone dangerously far toward ac-
cepting that suggestion. The .Court holds, ante, at 9, that it 
is appropriate in equitable apportionment litigation to weigh 
the harms and benefits to the competing States. It does so 
notwithstanding its recognition, ante, at 10, that the poten-
tial benefits from a proposed diversion are likely to be specu-
lative and remote, and therefore difficult to balance against 
any threatened harms, and its concession, ibid., that the eq-
uities supporting protection of an existing economy will usu-
ally be compelling. 
be burdened with conservation measures in order to permit a diversion by 
Colorado, the Court observed: 
"We think [the] doctrine [of appropriation] lays on each of these States a 
duty to exercise her right reasonably and in a manner calculated to con-
serve the common supply. Notwithstanding her present contention, Wyo-
ming has in fact proceeded on this line, for, as the proof shows, her appro-
priators, with her sanction, have provided and have in service reservoir 
facilities which are adapted for the purpose and reasonably sufficient to 
meet its requirements." Id., at 484-485 (emphasis added). 
2 Evidence in the record indicates that the Conservancy District has em-
ployed an engineering firm to investigate the feasibility of constructing an 
enclosed system to deliver stock water to the District's land owners. Tr. 
1318. 
'1 
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In equitable apportionment litigation between two prior 
appropriation States concerning the waters of a fully appro-
priated river, this Court has never undertaken that balancing 
task outside the concrete context of either two established 
economies in the competing States dependent upon the wa-
ters to be apportioned 3 or of a proposed diversion in one 
State to satisfy a demonstrable need for a potable supply of 
drinking water. 4 In the former context, the Court may as-
sess the relative benefit and detriment by reference to the ac-
tual fruits of use of the waters in the respective States. 5 In 
3 See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); Washington v. Ore-
gon, 297 U. S. 517 (1936); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46 (1907). 
'See New Jersey v. New York, 283 U. S. 336 (1931); Connecticut v. 
Massachusetts, 282 U. S. 660 (1931). It is also significant to note that 
these disputes occurred between two riparian States. 
Wyoming v. Colorado, supra, does not represent an exception to the 
pattern stated in the text. The Court did not engage in any wholesale bal-
ancing of the relative harms and benefits to the two States from the pro-
posed diversion. Rather, the Court imposed a very limited duty on Wyo-
ming to make use of the storage facilities her appropriators already had in 
place, see note 1 supra, for the purpose of calculating the dependable sup-
ply of water available to Wyoming. 259 U. S. , at 484. The Court was 
thereby able to determine that the waters of the Laramie River were not 
fully appropriated and that a share of the waters was available for Colora-
do's proposed use. 
5 For example, in Kansas v. Colorado, supra, Kansas sought to restrain 
Colorado from diverting waters of the Arkansas River for the irrigation of 
lands in Colorado. Colorado had diverted waters from the river since the 
1880's. As a result of irrigation, the population of the irrigated areas, the 
number of acres cultivated, and the value of farm products produced in 
these areas escalated dramatically. 206 U. S. , at 108-109. The Court 
compared this demonstrated salutary effect of the irrigation on the econ-
omy of Colorado with the corresponding population changes and changes in 
acreage and production of com and wheat in the affected Kansas counties 
for the same period. !d. , at 110-113. Using these concrete data, the 
Court was able to discern some minimal injury to Kansas as a result of the 
diminution of the flow of the Arkansas River. !d., at 113-114. Viewing 
the overall impact of the available water on the two economies, however, 
the Court concluded: 
"[W]hen we compare the amount of this detriment [to Kansas] with the 
great benefit which has obviously resulted to the counties in Colorado, it 
......... 
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the latter context, the compelling nature of the proposed use 
reduces the speculation that might otherwise attend assess-
ment of the benefits of a proposed diversion. Where, as 
here, however, no existing economy in Colorado depends on 
the waters of the Vermejo and the actual uses in New Mexico 
rank in equal importance with the proposed uses in Colo-
rado, 6 the difficulty of arriving at the proper balance is espe-
cially great. 
This case therefore highlights the restraint with which the 
Court should proceed .in apportioning interstate waters be-
tween a State seeking afuture use and a State with an exist-
ing economy dependent upon the waters to be apportioned. 
The Court can only invite litigation within its original juris-
diction if it permits one State to obtain a diversion for a new 
use upon that State's allegation that the second State is en-
gaging in "wasteful" practices or that she can make "better" 
use of the waters, even if the second State's uses are entirely 
reasonable. 
would seem that equality of right and equity between the two States for-
bids any interference with the present withdrawal of water in Colorado for 
purposes of irrigation." Ibid. 
Quite clearly, the Court was not forced to speculate about the benefit and 
detriment of the diversion to the competing States. 
Similarly, in Washington v. Oregon, supra, the Court was equipped to 
assess the balance of harm and benefit to the economies from the diversion 
at issue. Washington sought an injunction against Oregon's diversion of 
waters of the Walla Walla River for irrigation in Oregon. On the one 
hand, Oregon had an existing agricultural economy dependent upon irriga-
tion from the Walla Walla. On the other hand, the evidence revealed that 
there would be absolutely no benefit to Washington in prohibiting Oregon's 
diversion during periods of water shortage; the nature of the river channel 
was such that even if the water was not diverted by Oregon users, it would 
be absorbed by the gravel beneath the channel and never reach Washing-
ton users. 297 U. S. , at 522-523. The Court therefore concluded that 
"[t]o limit the long established use in Oregon would materially injure Ore-
gon users without a compensating benefit to Washington users. " Id., at 
523. 
6 According to Colorado, the diverted water would be used "in industrial 
operations at coal mines, agriculture, timbering, power generation, domes-
tic needs and other industrial operations .... " Reply Brief for Colorado 
8 . 
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I do not suggest, of course, that the Court must blind itself 
to compelling evidence of waste by one State. Protection of 
existing economies does not require that users be permitted 
to continue in unreasonably wasteful or inefficient practices. 
But the Court should be moved to exercise its original juris-
diction to alter the status quo between States only where 
there is clear and convincing evidence, ante, at 11, n. 13, that 
one State's use is unreasonably wasteful. To allow Colorado 
a diversion upon a lesser showing comports neither with the 
equality of rights of the litigants before us, see Connecticut 
v. Massachusetts, 282 U. S. 660, 670 (1931), nor with the 
sparing use that should be made of the Court's equitable pow-
ers, see id., at 669. Further, such action would seriously un-
dermine the Court's affirmation, ante, at 7, that priority of 
appropriation is the "guiding principle" in allocating waters 
between two prior appropriation States. 
The Court's remand reflects its judgment that the paucity 
of the factual findings before us furnishes an inadequate basis 
upon which to make "the delicate adjustment of interests" at 
stake, Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U. S. 589, 618 (1945). I 
concur in that disposition insofar as the Special Master's find-
ings and conclusions do not provide a basis for determining 
whether Colorado has demonstrated by clear and convincing 
evidence that the Conservancy District has engaged in unrea-
sonably wasteful practices. 
j;n.vrtutt Qflllld gf t4t 'Jnittb j;bdt$' 
Jl'Mlfington, ~.<If. 21lc?'!~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
December 7, 1982 
No. 80 Orig. Colorado. v. New Mexico 
Dear Lewis, 
Thurgood did not incorporate the suggestions 
made by Bill Brennan, which disappoints me greatly. I 
could write a dissent with as much enthusiasm as a 
concurrence in the judgment. 
I enclose 
judgment but if you 
please let me know. 
anyone else as yet. 
Justice Powell 
....... 
a draft of a concurrence in the 
think it is preferable to dissent, 
I have not circulated this to 
Sincerely, 
job 12/07/82 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Jim 
Re: Colorado v. New Mexico, No. 80 Original 
Justice Marshall now has six votes for his draft and the Chief 
will no doubt also join. There is thus probably a need to expedite 
any separate writing, and I thus suggest that you indicate to 
Justice O'Connor that you will join her opinion. I have worked with 
Justice O'Connor's clerk on her present draft and have today 
suggested that she clarify her views as to "unreasonably wasteful" 
in a footnote. Because that footnote may be more representative of 
my idiosyncratic preferences than your views, you might not make 
your approval unqualified. I think, however, that the Justice 
O'Connor's draft, as written or modified, is consistent with your 
views as I understand them. 
I agree that the draft is best styled a concurrence in the 
judgment. 
~
'l'o: The Chief Justice 
Justice Brennan 
Justice Marshall 'f Justice White 1-1} 




From: Justice O'Connor 
Circulated: _ D_E_C __ 8_ 19_82 __ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
STATE OF COLORADO, PLAINTIFF v. STATE OF 
NEW MEXICO AND ROBERT K. CORGIN, ATTORNEY 
GENERAL OF NEW MEXICO 
ON BILL OF COMPLAINT 
No. 80, Orig. Decided December-, 1982 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in the judgment. 
The doctrine of prior appropriation includes the require-
ment that the appropriator's use of water be beneficial and 
reasonable. What is reasonable, of course, does not admit of 
ready definition, being dependent upon the particular facts 
and circumstances of each case. In this case, the Special 
Master has cast an accusatory finger at the Vermejo Conser-
vancy District, concluding that "[t]he system of canals used 
to transport the water to the fields is inefficient." Report of 
the Special Master, p. 8. 
Undoubtedly, there is evidence in the record indicating 
that large losses of water occur through seepage and evapo-
ration in transporting waters of the Vermejo through open 
ditches for irrigation and stock watering. Tr. 1315. It is a 
leap, however, from observing that large losses occur to con-
cluding, as Colorado would have the Court do, that the prac-
tices of the Conservancy District are wasteful or unreason-
able. As the Court observes, ante, at 8, 9, the extent of the 
duty to conserve that may be placed upon the user is limited 
to measures that are "financially and physically feasible," 
Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U. S. 419, 484 (1922), and "within 
practicable limits." Ibid. 1 Nevertheless, in concluding that 
' It is significant to note that in Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U. S. 419 
(1922), upon which the Court relies for the proposition that an affirmative 
duty to conserve may be imposed on the States, ante, at 8, the Wyoming 
appropriators already had storage facilities in place for equalizing the riv-
er's natural flow. In answering Wyoming's objection that she should not 
. . 
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the Conservancy District's distribution system is "inef-
ficient," the Special Master made no factual finding that im-
proved economy in that system is within the practicable 
means available to the District. 2 
Colorado would have the Court assess the Conservancy 
District's "waste" and "inefficiency" by a new yardstick-
i. e., not by comparing the economic gains to the District 
with the costs of achieving greater efficiency, but by compar-
ing the "inefficiency" of New Mexico's uses with the relative 
benefits to Colorado of a new use. The Special Master has 
succumbed to this suggestion. His recommendation that 
Colorado be permitted a diversion embodies the judgment 
that, because Colorado can, in some unidentified sense, make 
"better" use of the waters of the Vermejo, New Mexico may 
be forced to change her present uses. 
Today the Court has also gone dangerously far toward ac-
cepting that suggestion. The Court holds, ante, at 9, that it 
is appropriate in equitable apportionment litigation to weigh 
the harms and benefits to the competing States. It does so 
notwithstanding its recognition, ante, at 10, that the poten-
tial benefits from a proposed diversion are likely to be specu-
lative and remote, and therefore difficult to balance against 
any threatened harms, and its concession, ibid., that the eq-
uities supporting protection of an existing economy will usu-
ally be compelling. 
be burdened with conservation measures in order to permit a diversion by 
Colorado, the Court observed: 
"We think [the] doctrine [of appropriation] lays on each of these States a 
duty to exercise her right reasonably and in a manner calculated to con-
serve the common supply. Notwithstanding her present contention, Wyo-
ming has in fact proceeded on this line, for, as the proof shows, her appro-
priators, with her sanction, have provided and have in service reservoir 
facilities which are adapted for the purpose and reasonably sufficient to 
meet its requirements." /d., at 484-485 (emphasis added). 
2 Evidence in the record indicates that the Conservancy District has em-
ployed an engineering firm to investigate the feasibility of constructing an 
enclosed system to deliver stock water to the District's land owners. Tr. 
1318 . 
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In equitable apportionment litigation between two prior 
appropriation States concerning the waters of a fully appro-
priated river, this Court has never undertaken that balancing 
task outside the concrete context of either two established 
economies in the competing States dependent upon the wa-
ters to be apportioned 3 or of a proposed diversion in one 
State to satisfy a demonstrable need for a potable supply of 
drinking water. 4 In the former context, the Court may as-
sess the relative benefit and detriment by reference to the ac-
tual fruits of use of the waters in the respective States. 6 In 
3 See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U. S. 589 (1945); Washington v. Ore-
gon, 297 U. S. 517 (1936); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46 (1907). 
• See New Jersey v. New York, 283 U. S. 336 (1931); Connecticut v. 
Massachusetts, 282 U. S. 660 (1931). It is also significant to note that 
these disputes occurred between two riparian States. 
Wyoming v. Colorado, supra, does not represent an exception to the 
pattern stated in the text. The Court did not engage in any wholesale bal-
ancing of the relative harms and benefits to the two States from the pro-
posed diversion. Rather, the Court imposed a very limited duty on Wyo-
ming to make use of the storage facilities her appropriators already had in 
place, see note 1 supra, for the purpose of calculating the dependable sup-
ply of water available to Wyoming. 259 U. S., at 484. The Court was 
thereby able to determine that the waters of the Laramie River were not 
fully appropriated and that a share of the waters was available for Colora-
do's proposed use. 
6 For example, in Kansas v. Colorado, supra, Kansas sought to restrain 
Colorado from diverting waters of the Arkansas River for the irrigation of 
lands in Colorado. Colorado had diverted waters from the river since the 
1880's. As a result of irrigation, the population of the irrigated areas, the 
number of acres cultivated, and the value of farm products produced in 
these areas escalated dramatically. 206 U. S., at 108-109. The Court 
compared this demonstrated salutary effect of the irrigation on the econ-
omy of Colorado with the corresponding population changes and changes in 
acreage and production of corn and wheat in the affected Kansas counties 
for the same period. Id. , at 110-113. Using these concrete data, the 
Court was able to discern some minimal injury to Kansas as a result of the 
diminution of the flow of the Arkansas River. I d., at 113--114. Viewing 
the overall impact of the available water on the two economies, however, 
the Court concluded: 
"[W]hen we compare the amount of this detriment [to Kansas] with the 
great benefit which has obviously resulted to the counties in Colorado, it 
4 COLORADO v. NEW MEXICO 
the latter context, the compelling nature of the proposed use 
reduces the speculation that might otherwise attend assess-
ment of the benefits of a proposed diversion. Where, as 
here, however, no existing economy in Colorado depends on 
the waters of the Vermejo and the actual uses in New Mexico 
rank in equal importance with the proposed uses in Colo-
rado, 6 the difficulty of arriving at the proper balance is espe-
cially great. 
This case therefore highlights the restraint with which the 
Court should proceed in apportioning interstate waters be-
tween a State seeking afuture use and a State with an exist-
ing economy dependent upon the waters to be apportioned. 
The Court can only invite litigation within its original juris-
diction if it permits one State to obtain a diversion for a new 
use upon that State's allegation that the second State is en-
gaging in "wasteful" practices or that she can make "better" 
use of the waters, even if the second State's uses are entirely 
reasonable. 
would seem that equality of right and equity between the two States for-
bids any interference with the present withdrawal of water in Colorado for 
purposes of irrigation." Ibid. 
Quite clearly, the Court was not forced to speculate about the benefit and 
detriment of the diversion to the competing States. 
Similarly, in Washington v. Oregon, supra, the Court was equipped to 
assess the balance of harm and benefit to the economies from the diversion 
at issue. Washington sought an injunction against Oregon's diversion of 
waters of the Walla Walla River for irrigation in Oregon. On the one 
hand, Oregon had an existing agricultural economy dependent upon irriga-
tion from the Walla Walla. On the other hand, the evidence revealed that 
there would be absolutely no benefit to Washington in prohibiting Oregon's 
diversion during periods of water shortage; the nature of the river channel 
was such that even if the water was not diverted by Oregon users, it would 
be absorbed by the gravel beneath the channel and never reach Washing-
ton users. 297 U. S., at 522-523. The Court therefore concluded that 
"[t]o limit the long established use in Oregon would materially injure Ore-
gon users without a compensating benefit to Washington users." !d., at 
523. 
' According to Colorado, the diverted water would be used "in industrial 
operations at coal mines, agriculture, timbering, power generation, domes-
tic needs and other industrial operations .... " Reply Brief for Colorado 
8. 
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I do not suggest, of course, that the Court must blind itself 
to compelling evidence of waste by one State. Protection of 
existing economies does not require that users be permitted 
to continue in unreasonably wasteful or inefficient practices. 
But the Court should be moved to exercise its original juris-
diction to alter the status quo between States only where 
there is clear and convincing evidence, ante, at 11, n. 13, that 
one State's use is unreasonably wasteful. To allow Colorado 
a diversion upon a lesser showing comports neither with the 
equality of rights of the litigants before us, see Connecticut 
v. Massachusetts, 282 . U. S. 660, 670 (1931), nor with the 
sparing use that should be made of the Court's equitable pow-
ers, see id., at 669. Further, such action would seriously un-
dermine the Court's affirmation, ante, at 7, that priority of 
appropriation is the "guiding principle" in allocating waters 
between two prior appropriation States. 
The Court's remand reflects its judgment that the paucity 
of the factual findings before us furnishes an inadequate basis 
upon which to make "the delicate adjustment of interests" at 
stake, Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U. S. 589, 618 (1945). I 
concur in that disposition insofar as the Special Master's find-
ings and conclusions do not provide a basis for determining 
whether Colorado has demonstrated by clear and convincing 
evidence that the Conservancy District has engaged in unrea-
sonably wasteful practices. 
December 8, 1982 
80 Orig. Colorado v. New Mexico 
Dear Sandra: 
I like your opinion a great deal more than that of 
Thurgood, and will be glad to join it. 
I have a slight preference for calling it a 
concurrence in the judgment, but - as you say - could join a 









December a, 1082 
80 Oriq. Colorado v . New Mexico 
Sandra : 
Please ioin me in your. opinion concurring in the 
judgment . 
Sincerely , 
Justice O' Connor 
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